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Abstract: In order to explore the effective incentive design relying on qualified 
performance assessment for human resource development in corporations, the study 
conducted innovative exploration by employing Option Pricing Model to derive 
optimal incentive considering the uncertainties. Panel Least Regression is executed 
for Pooled, fixed effect, and random effect, through processing the 16 largest listing 
firm in Shanghai Stock Exchange Index 50, from the year 2008 to 2016. It results that 
performance assessment of operational efficiency is the key to determine the level of 
compensation and it can effectively motivate employed executive to perform 
optimally, incorporating the uncertainty faced by both firm and executives. It is 
suggested to fetch operating efficiency as key benchmark for incentive design. It is 
strongly against the usage of overall performance measurement Return on Equity as 
the key benchmark as currently what the market is doing.  
 
Keywords: Performance Assessment, Option Pricing Model, Effective incentive, 
Human Resource Development 
 
Introduction 
Designing an effective incentive and rewarding system has been one of crucial 
components of corporate governance, which inevitably challenges decision making 
of both shareholders and employees.   It is unarguably supported by Murphy (1985), 
that executive compensation is strongly positively related with corporate 
performance.  
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In addition, Haubrich (1994) further expresses the non-expensive incentives for 
enhancing a firm’s performance to a CEO. Sigler (2011) explored the significant 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance, 
recognizing the material impacts from firms’ size. The similar findings have been 
presented by Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawer III (1989), from which profit sharing results 
higher productivity and improved firm performance. In addition, Swanson and 
Holton (2001) illustrated the comprehensive model for diagnosing organizational 
system in which performance measurement systems have definite impacts on 
organization effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, information asymmetry and agency problem do impede the 
perfective contribution of incentive system to corporate performance and complicate 
the resulting firms’ value. For instance, Wulf (2007) strongly demonstrates the 
negative tradeoff between risk and incentives and illustrates incentive design 
conditioned with authority over project selection, for maximizing firm performance. 
Meanwhile, Jasen (2001) contributes the important concept of “Kinked” relationship 
between pay and performance, in which poor-performing employees are more willing 
to take risky projects resulting reduced corporate value, and good-performing 
employees are more willing to take less risky projects causing opportunities forgone.  
Recognizing the important role of performance incentive system, in the 
circumstance of fast developing economy of China, the reform of listing firms’ 
rewarding system is under the urgent agenda. Improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of operational activities are the crucial hinge for Chinese listing firms’ 
competitiveness, which is fully understood by executives and regulators. How to 
implement optimal rewarding system including the compensation range, is one of 
critical issues that Chinese firms are seeking. Unfortunately, Firth and Rui (2005) 
demonstrate non-apparent relationship between performance and pay due to the state 
agency as the major shareholders. It raises the question about the effectiveness of 
Chinese listing firms’ incentive systems. 
It is worth to mention the constructive findings for confronting the problems. 
Joskow and Rose (1994) suggest Boards may discount extreme performance 
outcomes both high and low relative to performance that lies within some “normal” 
band in setting compensation. Further improved by Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 
(2005), and Baker (2000), both the difference between actual and expected economic 
profit, and characteristics of performance measures, have been proposed as key 
considerations into incentive design. In short, all the studies mainly confront the 
similar issues such as, linkage between corporate profitability and employees’ 
performance, information asymmetric between employer and employee, agency 
problem existing in the organizational structure, and so on.  It is unobservable for 
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firm to conclude performances of the year at the beginning of the each period even 
thought the incentive arrangement has to be announced to employees in advance. 
Therefore, firm is facing uncertainty of employees’ performance when is committing 
the payment of incentives.  
The study grounds on the aforementioned practical issues to explore the 
optimal bonus range recognizing the ambiguous performance types of employee. By 
assuming the incentive payment to poor-performing employees as long call option in 
finance and assuming the incentive payment to good-performing employees as short 
call option with different exercise price (which is minimum and maximum 
compensation). Through Option Pricing Model, it results the optimal bonus range, 
which is the difference between maximum bonus (ceiling) and minimum bonus 
(flooring). Following the calculation of optimal bonus range, a multivariable 
regression analysis will be executed to detect the relationship between optimal bonus 
range and other control variables that representing firms’ characteristics including 
firm size, profitability, capital structure, and industrial classification. These 
observable controlling variables will be the factors of guideline that leads firm to 
design the incentive range in practice. 
 
Literature Review 
It is systematically demonstrated by Swanson and Holton (2001) that there are three-
legged stool, with the three legs providing stability for Human Resource development 
for effective functioning in uncertainty. It is proposed that Human Resource 
Development should be the integration of psychological, economic, and system 
theories within an ethical frame. In addition, there are three specific economic theory 
perspectives to the discipline of Human Resource Development, which includes, 
scarce resource theory, sustainable resource theory, and human capital theory.  
There are three specific psychological theory perspective proposed to the 
discipline of human resource development, which includes, Gestalt psychology, 
Behavioral Psychology, and Cognitive (purposive-behaviorism) psychology. It is 
worth to address that HRD should to include direct analysis, action, and measurement 
of economic outcomes, without which there is no motivation paid off from firm to 
employees. The purpose of any business organization is to maximize the wealth and 
gain profitability and any requirements for human resource/capital development aims 
for these goals. Unfortunately, in past decades, there were lack of literatures address 
the issues of one of there Human Resource Development’s “leg” – Economic. Instead 
most of literatures were emphasizing on the “leg”-Psychology.  
Nevertheless, the theory of HRD should be the “integration” rather than 
“isolation” of three aforementioned “legs”, especially when we are studying business 
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organizations. Therefore, this study aims to explore the economic perspective of HRD 
theory without ignoring the System and Psychological perspectives, which will be 
elaborated and discussed in detail in the later chapters. It is prevailed rewarding 
system that compensation partially in alignment with performance achievement, 
which subject to the conditional ceiling due to the profitability protection and floors 
considering labor legislative requirement. The employee with high potential to 
contribute relative enormous profitability is more willing to take risky projects. 
Nevertheless, the one with low risk-taking propensity is the employee has less 
capability to be success in project implementation, for which basic salary and wage 
will be offered as the result.  
The poor-performing employees are more willing to take risky projects under 
the protection of floor of basic salary. However, the good-performing employees are 
more willing to conduct conservatively although with the relative high capability to 
success, due to the demotivation effects of bonus ceiling. It is explicitly expressed in 
“Figure 1.1: The Kinked Relationship between Pay and Performance”, from which 
vertical axis is pay consisting of basic salary and bonus, and horizontal axis is the 
level of performance from poor to good. The linear relationship does exist in between 
the point A and B. It is resulted that the risky projects with relative high possibility to 
success if undertaken by good-performing employees will be forgone due to the 
mechanism of demotivation from bonus ceiling placed toward them. On the other 
hand, the projects with relative high possibility to fail if undertaken by poor-
performing employees will be implemented in expectation of receiving extra bonus 
if success by chance. Comprehensively, the firm will be taking less profitability 
projects, which in turn definitely will deteriorates the wealth maximization goal of 
firm. 
Although the firm’s willingness to pay for the bonus is determined by firm’s 
size and industrial classification etc., it is theoretical irresistible to state that market 
mechanism does play the role of choosing the firm as the demanding side of labor. 
The firm’s bonus setting or say pay alignment with performance have to incorporate 
the market response of employees based on own cost-benefit analysis for utility 
maximization. Consequently, it is acceptable to consider the equilibrium point 
between the pay to and input from employees. Employees are going to be demotivated 
in the scenario of bonus constraints and therefore the firms are willing to expand the 
bonus range.  
Alternatively, employees are more willing to take the risky project with less 
possibility to win. It results that firm will decrease the basic salary level and expand 
the bonus range, as long as in accordance to the legislative requirement. As the result, 
there is the market mechanism of bonus dynamics accordance to the performance of 
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employees, to which employees interactively adjust the input according to the bonus 
floors and ceilings adjustment. Although employee compensation reform in Chinese 
industrial sector has been discussed in the literature, the real changes in compensation 
system and pay practices have received insufficient attention and warrant further 
examination. Cieri, Zhu, and Dowling (1998) briefly reviewed the pre- and post-
reform compensation system, and reports the results of a survey of pay practices in 
the four major types of industrial enterprises in China.  
The research findings indicated that the type of enterprise ownership has little 
influence on general compensation practices, adoption of profit-sharing plans, and 
subsidy and allowance packages. In general, pay is linked more to individual 
performance and has become an important incentive to Chinese employees. However, 
differences are found across the enterprise types with regard to performance-related 
pay. Current pay practices are positively correlated to overall effectiveness of the 
enterprise. 
One of the major implications is the interdependence of other reforms. When 
the PRC was founded in 1949, the government adopted a ‘three into one’ system that 
mixed employment, wages and welfare (Huang & Yang, 1987). This policy forced 
enterprises, especially those in the public sector, to evenly distribute subsidies and 
allowances to their employees. Therefore, while a new compensation system is 
needed to help improve productivity, it depends on reforms in other fields, such as 
releasing SOEs’ (State Owned Enterprises) heavy burden of social welfare (Liu, 
1996), and establishing an acceptable objective performance appraisal system to 
strengthen the link between work and pay (Zhu & Dowling, 1997).  
Overall, the results of many researches have supported the prediction of 
Adler, Campbell and Laurent (1989) that reforms in China would bring a trend 
towards performance-based compensation systems. Shenkar has argued that 
continuing reforms “may change the situation, particularly in collective, private, and 
foreign-invested enterprises” (1994). The research findings suggest that there is likely 
to be greater diversity in China in the future, with POEs and FIEs, in particular, 
placing increasing emphasis on performance-based compensation.  
 
Application of Option Pricing Model to HRD Theory 
The power of application of Option Pricing Model essentially captures the nature of 
decisions based on the dynamic payoff in future. The selection of future payoff is 
explicitly the decision on the portfolio construction in current period. With 
uncertainty incorporated into the model, the option-pricing model can be employed 
to decide the current portfolio’s value. The benefit of option pricing model is not only 
the portfolio construction of decision making but also market mechanism of pricing 
 
 
 
 
 
390
dynamics. It is demonstrated that for European call option there is a fixed relationship 
between the price of put and call options with the same maturity date that are written 
on the single assets, which derived by Stoll (1969) is called put-call parity 
relationship. The application of Optimal Pricing Model can capture the psychological 
responses from human capital facing business uncertainty and incorporates the 
economic outcome into systematic measurement and motivation to employees’ 
performance. More specifically, when people face uncertainty of firm performance in 
future, they will perform in different ways due to his/her different capacity. This 
situation will definitely result different compensation cost for firms. Qualitative 
analysis possesses limited scope to handle it effectively. Fortunately, one of 
quantitative approach called optimal option pricing model can integrate the 
“uncertainty”, “response with different capacity”, “resulted different compensation 
costs for firm”, all together in statistical model.  
In the case of pay with performance, the compensation can be considered as the 
portfolio payoff of decisions. The good-performing employees are choosing the 
portfolio of shorting the call option, with exercise price equivalent to the summation 
of fixed payment (salary in the kinked linear relationship) and bonus range. If good 
performance is achieving the projects return that results higher bonus than ceiling, 
the good-performing employee only receives the ceiling that is the exercise price, in 
which the bonus payment is linearly proportional to project return. In the case that 
good-performing employees failed in operating the projects, the bonus will declined, 
which is the call option longed. The one with poor performance actually is selecting 
the portfolio of long the call option with exercise price equals to fixed payment (salary 
in the kinked linear relationship).  
The case illustrated is exactly the duplication of bull spread of options, which 
can be created by buying a call on an asset with a certain strike price and selling a 
call on the same asset with a higher strike price. Definitely, the asset derived by option 
is the actual performance of employee, which is proportional to profitability of firm. 
The performance results from both the employees’ conducts and market 
circumstance. Therefore with equal possibility of success, the expected future payoff, 
to both good-performing and poor-performing employees, are the summation of 
payoffs of states two and three, both weighed by the possibility. More specifically, 
when both good and poor performance employees achieve bad results that deserves 
less than minimum pay, they are given basic salary with zero extra bonus. When the 
preferred performance achieved by relative poor-performing employees, the extra 
bonus is offered. In contrary, there is no extra bonus that more than ceiling offered to 
good-performing employees if the performance results in-between the bonus range. 
Worth to remind, the good-performing employees are going to loss the deserved extra 
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bonus for the part that more than the ceiling of bonus range, if they perform 
excellently high.  
Consequently, current rewarding system is creating hypothetical bull spread options 
to the decisions of good-performing employees and poor-performing employees. The 
resulting extra bonus pay is exactly in the range of bonus that defined and expected 
by the firm. The question is that, what’s the theoretical bonus range that leads the 
equilibrium to the firm and employees, recognizing the market mechanism.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
In the theory of human resources development, as one of components of 
“Psychology” perspective, cognitive psychology states that purposive-behaviorism 
attempts to explain goal-directed behavior and the idea that human beings organize 
their lives around purposes. Low-capability employee takes risky-but-easy-to-fail 
action due to the factor that the minimum wag still can be paid out even the purpose 
can not be achieved. High-capability employees take less-risky-but-highly possible-
to-success projects due to the factor that the compensation cannot be more than 
ceiling even the risky-but-high-return project successes. Aforementioned arguments 
can exactly fit the so-called “purposive behaviorism” in the theory of Human 
Resource Development.  
If one of most crucial component of firm’s compensation system is to define 
efficient bonus range which means the ceiling of pay, it is the aim of study to derive 
the theoretical optimal difference between the two exercise prices of good-performing 
and poor-performing employees based on option pricing model. For solving the 
purpose, it is incorporated that firm’s profitability (therefore the pay as the proportion 
of it) follows binomial process in short run and continues-time dynamics in long run. 
Since the pay is linearly related to the profitability of firm, which usually is calculated 
based on the certain percentage of earnings of firm, the change of earning actually 
leads the change of compensation.  
However, the complicated theoretical bonus range derived from the Option 
Pricing Model does lead the ambiguous implications for firms’ executives. It is 
desirable to offer explicit and efficient proxies with statistically significant correlation 
with optimal bonus range. Referring to the literatures, numerous factors have been 
addressed in terms of importance in relevance to firms’ rewarding system. Among 
these factors, firms’ size, industrial classification, capital structure, and earning 
volatility, are receiving prevailing attentions.  
The study aims to derive the optimal theoretical incentive for facilitating the 
guidelines of rewarding system design, and thereafter, discover the empirical 
correlations between the inventive and list of factors for articulating the efficient 
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proxies. As the result, the proxies with degrees of significance can be listed as 
recommendations to firm executive for compensation design. Nevertheless the 
efficiency of methodology is not fully guaranteed thought the practice, the innovative 
path and theoretical implications can be strongly recommended to the academy and 
industries. The theoretical framework has been demonstrated in the following. 
 
In order to explore the suitable model for designing Chinese listing firms’ rational 
model of incentive regarding to performance assessed by financial terms, the study 
employed four levels of performance measured by, Return on Equity, Net Profit 
Margin, Operating Profit Margin, and Revenue, respectively. For specification, 
Return on Equity (ROE) assesses the overall performance of firm in specified period, 
dividing net income available for common shareholders by the total equity capital 
invested by common shareholders. The other three performance assessments measure 
different aspects of business activities. Net Profit Margin measures firms overall 
efficiency in terms of overall cost controls including both operational and non-
operational cost controls.  
Operating Profit Margining assesses the operational performances of firm, 
including production, marketing, and administrative activities of firm. By 
incorporating all levels of performance, the study seeks to establish rational strategies 
to design the incentives for executives through concentrating on the most effective 
linkage between incentive and specified resulting level of performance assessment. 
Acknowledging the dynamic characteristics of firms classified into different industry 
and poised at different financial burden, there are two control variables were 
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introduced into the model, which are industrial classifications (simply reclassified 
into financial and non-financial industries) and capital structure (measured by debt 
ratio of firm).  It is acceptable to simply classify the industries into finance and non-
financial industries due to the attributes of Shanghai Stock Exchange Index 50.  
 
Model for Corporate Performance Assessment and Incentive  
Following the theoretical measurement of optimal compensation range, a multivariate 
regression analysis will be conducted for exploration of proxies relevant to efficient 
ceiling of rewarding system, in which certain pertaining controlling variables will be 
incorporated. Those variables are, industrial classifications, firm size, capital 
structure, and earning volatility, suggested by research references. Among all 
regression variables, industrial classification will be the dummy variable in the 
model. Firm size is measured by log variable of firm market capitalization, capital 
structure is represented by the debt to equity ratio of firm, and earning volatility is 
measured by standard deviation of profit margin of firm.  
All the financial data will be collected from financial statements of listing firms 
in Shanghai Stock Exchange. The time series data of variables, compensation 
payments, volatility of compensation, firms’ total assets, firms’ debt to asset ratio, 
earnings, and dummy variables representing industrial classifications, are gathered 
from the quarterly financial statements of a sample of top 16 firms in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange over past 9 years, for processing the multivariable regression tests. These 
top 16 firms in Shanghai are from Stock Exchange of Shanghai 50 Index (SSE 50 
Index) consisting of 50 most representative stocks from Shanghai security market by 
scientific and objective method. The objective is to reflect the complete picture of 
those good quality large enterprises, which are most influential in Shanghai security 
market. It will be resulted that the considerable optimal compensation model can be 
suggested with executable framework.  
Worth to remind, the industrial classification is not only contributing regular 
industrial nature of Chinese listing firm but also special structure of Chinese stock 
market. According to Li, Lon, Wang, and Yuan (2013), government-controlled 
companies give more compensation to executives comparing to non-government-
controlled companies. And government-controlled companies scattered into similar 
industries.  
First of all, the theoretical compensation will be generated by “Optimal Option 
Pricing Model Calculator”, through inputs of relevant variables, including interest 
rates, compensation ceiling and floor (representing the exercise price of calls shorted 
and the exercise price of put longed), earning volatility, and so on. As long as the 
incentive costs (transferred from compensation paid by firm to executives) result, it 
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is one of variables in the panel regression model. 
The multicollinearity regression model of panel least square will be executed for 
exploring the practical relationship between, return on equity, compensation cost, net 
profit margin, operating profit margin, revenue, capital structure, and industrial 
classifications.  
 
The quantitative multicollinearity regression is presented as follows.  
  
  
 
Where, i represents the listing firm i. And LCOM is the log of theoretical optimal 
incentive cost of firm, which can be calculated based on actual minimum 
compensation and profitability that reported in the quarterly financial statements of 
listing firms and optimal compensation is the theoretical amount of optimal 
compensation generated from Option Price Model based on the compensation and 
performance of firms.  
There are two directions of regression. One holds the hypothesis that optimal 
change of compensation is statistically relevant one or more than one independent 
variables including four different level of performance assessment, industrial 
classification, and financial burden of firm. In this first regression, the optimal change 
of compensation is dependent variable.  
Another directional regression holds the hypothesis that optimal change of 
compensation is one of many independent variables that affect the overall 
performance of firm, which is measured by Return on Equity (ROE). In addition, due 
to the compensation variation among industrial classifications, 1 dummy variable of 
industrial belongings have been incorporated into the model.  
There are 2 major industrial classifications in the selected 16 firms from Chinese 
top 50 listing firm, including financial industry, and non-financial industry, such as 
wholesale and retail industry, manufacturing industry, and utility industry. The value 
of “1” represents financial industry and the value of “0” represents non-financial 
industry.  
 
Discussion  
Although the independent variables Operating Profit Margin and Revenue show 
significant determination on incentive, the low R square and later Hauseman Test 
reject the pooled test for relevance. Interestingly, when time period fixed, or in other 
ln LCOMit = a0 + a1(ln LROEit )+ a2 (ln LNMit )+ a3(ln LOPMit )+ a4 (ln LREVit )+ a5(ln LDEit )+ a6INDi +εit
ln LROEit = a0 + a1(ln LCOMit )+ a2 (ln LNMit )+ a3(ln LOPMit )+ a4 (ln LREVit )+ a5(ln LDEit )+ a6INDi +εit
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words, on the assumption of incentive consistency over time period variation, 
Operating Profit Margin really demonstrated strong relationship with incentive 
offerings to executive. Even though, after loosing the assumption of time consistency, 
operating profit margin still demonstrates strong determination power over incentive 
plan for executives.  
Worth to remind, when we assume both time period and cross section of firms 
are random, revenue comes to attention and shows the power of determination on 
incentives.  
Changing the direction of testing, it results the insignificant power of incentive 
in the explanation of overall firms’ return ROE. It turns out that ROE is not 
statistically relevant to the incentive plan. Instead of being impacted by incentive 
offering, firms overall performance assessment is relevant to other factors such as 
profit margin and financial structure. The accuracy of the Hausman test is an 
important issue in panel data analysis. A procedure for estimating the properties of 
the test, when dealing with specific data, is suggested and implemented. Based on 
simulation that mimics the original data, the size and power of Hausman test is 
obtained.  
The procedure is applied for different methods of estimating the panel data 
model with random effects: Swamy and Arora (1972), Amemiya (1971) and Nerlove 
(1971). Also, three types of critical values of the Hausman statistics distribution are 
used, where possible: asymptotical and Bootstrap (based on simulation and 
bootstrapping) critical values as well as Monte Carlo (based on pure simulation) 
critical values for estimating the small sample properties of Hausman test. The 
simulation mimics the original data as close as possible in order to make inferences 
specifically for the data at hand, but controls the correlation between one of the 
variables and the individual-specific component in the panel data model. The results 
indicate that Hausman test over-rejects the null hypothesis if performed based on its 
asymptotical critical values, when Swamy and Arora and Amemiya methods are used 
for estimating the random effects model. The Nerlove method of estimation leads to 
extreme under-rejection of the null-hypothesis.  
Testing for stationarity in panel data models is also per se a matter of interest 
and it can be more directly motivated. It seems fairly intuitive that, within the general 
class of models where heterogeneity is restricted to an individual fixed effect, the 
times series behavior of an individual variable should often be well approximated 
either as an autoregressive process with a small positive coefficient and large fixed 
effects or as an autoregressive process with a near-unit root and negligible individual 
fixed effects. Both alternatives can be nested in a single model, in which the test of 
the former against the latter is a panel data unit root test. One expects, however, that 
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such test might not perform well in a short panel, owing in particular to the problem 
of unobserved initial conditions and incidental parameter estimation. Trying to assess 
the properties of the available tests in a realistic setting is therefore of practical 
importance. 
 
Conclusions 
It results that incentive plan the firm should carry out is statistically significant to the 
operation and/or non-operational efficiency, recognizing differentiations between 
finance and non-finance industrial firms. No matter from what perspectives, 
descriptive or regression both are not supporting the importance of Return on Equity’s 
role playing in determining incentive plan. With or without considering firm’s 
consistency of incentive plan in responding to circumstance change over time 
variation, Profit Margin always demonstration strong supportive role in determining 
the inventive plan or compensation package. The strong linkage between optimal 
inventive and efficiency performance assessment is not getting weak even after 
Hauseman test. The control variable, industrial identity and firms’ capital structure 
do show some level of impacts on incentive. Nevertheless, it does not demonstrate 
statistically significant role for incentive that firm is designing.  
Conclusively, when we consider the uncertainty confronted by both firm’s 
employed executive and firm, optimal incentive costs for the firm is relevant to how 
efficiency the firm manages operational activities, rather than final overall 
performance assessment. It implies that traditional overall performance assessment 
of listing firms’ performance Return on Equity should not be considered or at least 
should not be emphasized in the designing of rewarding incentive in Chinese listing 
market. It probably due to the non-operation factors inefficient involving in the firm’s 
Return on Equity assessment. And those factors are irrelevant to the efficiency of 
performance by executives. It can be called “noisy impact”.  
Therefore, performance assessments including Return on Equity and 
Revenues/Sales, are not well defined to effective facilitate firms to design optimal 
incentive package for executives. More specifically, final overall performance 
measurement and marketing performance assessment are not qualified to be the proxy 
for designing compensation package. Performance assessment of operational 
efficiency is the key to determine the level of compensation and it can effectively 
motivate employed executive to perform optimally, incorporating the uncertainty 
faced by both firm and executives. It is suggested to fetch operating efficiency as key 
benchmark for incentive design. It is strongly against the usage of overall 
performance measurement Return on Equity as the key benchmark as currently what 
the market is doing.  
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It is worth to address that HRD should to include direct analysis, action, and 
measurement of economic outcomes, without which there is no motivation paid off 
from firm to employees. The purpose of any business organization is to maximize the 
wealth and gain profitability and any requirements for human resource/capital 
development aims for these goals. Unfortunately, in past decades, there were lack of 
literatures address the issues of one of there Human Resource Development’s “leg” – 
Economic. Instead most of literatures were emphasizing on the “leg”-Psychology. 
Nevertheless, the theory of HRD should be the “integration” rather than “isolation” 
of three aforementioned “legs”, especially when we are studying business 
organizations. Therefore, this study aims to explore the economic perspective of HRD 
theory without ignoring the System and Psychological perspectives, which will be 
elaborated and discussed in details. 
The theory of Human Resource Development requires the integration of 
psychological, economic, and system theories within an ethical frame. In addition, 
there are three specific economic theory perspectives to the discipline of Human 
Resource Development, which includes, scarce resource theory, sustainable resource 
theory, and human capital theory. There are three specific psychological theory 
perspective proposed to the discipline of human resource development, which 
includes, Gestalt psychology, Behavioral Psychology, and Cognitive (purposive-
behaviorism) psychology.  
The Optimal Pricing model innovatively integrates the economic (monetary 
compensation), systematic (standardized adopting and consistent benchmark), and 
psychological (clarification of objective to individuals) perspectives. The study is not 
only adopting the economic measurement to motivate the human capital’s 
performance but also consider the psychological response of individuals. The 
adoption of merely qualitative analysis method to the development theory of human 
resource development has the critical limitation due to the nature and goal of business 
organizations. As the goal of profit-oriented business organization is to maximizing 
wealth, the compensation costs must be dispensed based on the effectiveness and 
efficiency, assessed by performance of firm.  
In addition, employees response to the result and take action for the purpose of 
maximizing personal utility according to the theory of HRD and labor economy. 
Optimal Option Pricing model incorporates, the uncertainties, individual responses 
to uncertainties, and compensation payment by firm, to come up with theoretical 
incentive cost for the firm. Thereafter, after obtaining the theoretical incentive cost of 
firm, the regression had executed to explore the standardized and simplified proxy 
for effective performance incentive. As the results, profit margin can be the proxy for 
maximizing the linkage between performance and incentive. Profit margin is 
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standardized “economic” measurement to “systematically” establish “Psychological” 
objective for executives of firm. In summary, it results that one of financial 
measurements, “Profit Margin” is an effective integration of three components of 
theory of Human Resource Development, at least for the Chinese stock market the 
research studied.   
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